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QUALITY, NOT QUANTITY:  
THE IMPLICATIONS OF REDEFINING 
INSURANCE NEUTRALITY IN IN RE GLOBAL 
INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
Abstract: On May 4, 2011, in In re Global Industrial Technologies, Inc., the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that non-creditor insur-
ance companies had standing to challenge a debtor’s Chapter 11 plan of 
reorganization. In so holding, the court redefined the concept of insur-
ance neutrality. Whereas typically the court examines the text of a plan to 
determine its effects on an insurer’s rights,Global Industrial Technologies 
suggests that insurance neutrality in a mass-tort liability context depends 
on any post-petition increase in claims asserted. This Comment argues (1) 
that the new quantitative measure adopted by the court is an ineffective 
measure of insurance neutrality and (2) that the court should not rely on a 
third party to protect the integrity of the bankruptcy process, but should 
assume that responsibility itself through its sua sponte right to intervene. 
Introduction 
 In Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, a debtor’s plan of reor-
ganization affects many parties other than the debtor itself.1 Thus, 
standing is a critical issue in bankruptcy proceedings, as it determines 
an entity’s ability to ensure that its voice is heard before a plan is final-
ized.2 
 When a debtor is facing mass tort liability, the question of standing 
becomes particularly relevant to the debtor’s insurers.3 The Bankruptcy 
Code (the “Code”) allows a debtor’s reorganization plan to include a 
trust and channeling injunction, which together require all current 
and future mass tort claims to be brought against a dedicated pool of 
assets instead of against the company.4 Without this system, the debtor 
                                                                                                                      
 
1 Christopher W. Frost, Noncreditor “Party in Interest” Standing in the Bankruptcy Courts, 
Bankr. L. Letter, July 2011, at 1, 1. 
2 See id. 
3 See Leonard P. Goldberger, Last Man Standing: Insurers’ Participation in Plan Confirma-
tion Process, Am. Bankr. Inst. J., Nov. 2008, at 30, 30. 
4 See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) (2006); In re Global Indus. Techs., Inc., 645 F.3d 201, 205 n.10 
(3d Cir. 2011); In re Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 201 (3d Cir. 2004); Mark D. 
Plevin et al., The Future Claims Representative in Prepackaged Asbestos Bankruptcies: Conflicts of 
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would be subject to indefinite tort claims and would have difficulty re-
organizing.5 These trusts may be partially funded with the debtor’s in-
surance policies.6 Although the insurance company is not a creditor in 
that situation, it is liable for coverage of any claims that are successfully 
asserted against the trust.7 Accordingly, insurance companies have a 
particular interest in being able to challenge reorganization plans that 
include mass tort trusts and channeling injunctions.8 
 Section 1109(b) of the Code expressly gives standing to certain 
parties with direct interests in the proceeding, such as the debtor, trus-
tees, and creditors.9 Parties not explicitly given standing must satisfy 
requirements both under Article III of the Constitution and under the 
Code.10 An insurer whose policy has been assigned to a mass tort trust 
does not fall into any of the groups which are conferred standing by 
section 1109(b).11 Thus, an insurer must have Constitutional and Code 
standing to challenge the confirmation of a plan.12 
 Constitutional standing requires that a party “demonstrate an in-
jury in fact that is concrete, distinct and palpable, and actual or immi-
nent.”13 Additionally, the injury must be related to the challenged ac-
tion and be correctable.14 Code standing is granted to a party in 
ter
                                                                                                                     
in est.15 
 In 2010, interpreting Code and Constitutional standing require-
ments as coextensive, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 
in In re Global Industrial Technologies, Inc., held that a group of insurance 
 
Interest, Strange Alliances, and Unfamiliar Duties for Burdened Bankruptcy Courts, 62 N.Y.U. 
Ann. Surv. Am. L. 271, 271 (2006). 
5 Plevin et al., supra note 4, at 276. 
6 See Alan N. Resnick, Bankruptcy as a Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise-Threatening Mass Tort 
Liability, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2045, 2084 (2000). 
7 See Frost, supra note 1, at 1. 
8 See Goldberger, supra note 3, at 30. 
9 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (“A party in interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a credi-
tors’ committee, an equity security holders’ committee, a creditor, an equity security hold-
er, or any indenture trustee, may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in a case 
under this chapter.”). 
10 See Global Indus. Techs., 645 F.3d at 210 (“[A] party must, in the first instance, meet 
the requirements for standing that litigants in all federal cases face under Article III of the 
Constitution. . . . Standing in bankruptcy cases is also governed by the terms of 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1109(b) . . . .”). 
11 See 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b); Frost, supra note 1, at 1–2. 
12 See Global Indus. Techs., 645 F.3d at 210; Frost, supra note 1, at 1–2. 
13 Global Indus. Techs., 645 F.3d at 210 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
14 Id. 
15 See id. at 211 (“[T]he Bankruptcy Code expressly provides that parties in interest 
‘may object to confirmation of a plan.’” (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1128(b))). 
2012] The Implications of Redefining Insurance Neutrality 347 
companies whose policies had been assigned to the proposed trust suf-
fered an injury, and thus had standing to object to the reorganization 
plan.16 Specifically, the court held that because the plan called for the 
creation of a trust to resolve silica-related claims, it resulted in a signifi-
cant increase in the number of claims asserted, and therefore was not 
insurance neutral.17 Even though the insurers had not yet contributed 
any money to the trust, the court held that they had suffered an injury 
sufficient to warrant standing in the bankruptcy proceeding.18 This ap-
proach to insurance neutrality differed from the standard used by the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in 2004, in In re Combustion 
Engineering, Inc., where the court only looked at the plan’s language 
and not the plan’s effect on the number of claims.19 A significant factor 
in the Global Industrial Technologies decision was the suspected collusion 
between the debtor and the claimants’ counsel during the solicitation 
f co
     
o nfirmation votes.20 
 This Comment argues that a post-petition increase in the number 
of claims against a trust is an ineffective measure of injury and should 
not determine whether a plan is insurance neutral.21 Additionally, this 
Comment argues that courts should not rely on third parties to raise 
issues of wrongdoing; instead, bankruptcy courts should protect the 
integrity of their proceedings.22 Part I of this Comment provides a brief 
overview of how the bankruptcy process provides relief for corporations 
facing mass tort claims.23 Part II discusses the Third Circuit’s treatment 
of insurance neutrality in Global Industrial Technologies and how that 
treatment differs from the previous approach taken in Combustion Engi-
neering.24 Finally, Part III outlines issues with finding injury based on an 
                                                                                                                 
16 Id. at 211, 213–14. The court’s decision to interpret Code standing and Constitu-
tional standing as coextensive was influenced by the purpose of 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b): to 
“encourag[e] and promot[e] greater participation in reorganization cases.” See id. at 211 
(quoting In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1042 (3d Cir. 1985)). Under this rationale, to 
require more stringent standards for Code standing than for Constitutional standing 
wou at goal. See id. 
usion against the debtor and claim-
ants
t. 
ld frustrate th
17 Id. at 212. 
18 See id. at 213–14. 
19 See 391 F.3d at 218. 
20 See Global Indus. Techs., 645 F.3d at 214 (noting that because the insurers were the 
only parties with the incentive to assert claims of coll
’ counsel, standing was particularly appropriate). 
21 See infra notes 83–102 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 103–118 and accompanying tex
23 See infra notes 26–38 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 39–77 and accompanying text. 
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increase in claims asserted, and proposes an alternate way that the 
c ts should combat collusion in the plan voting process.our
 percent of the 
rr
ny of these firms may have enormous power to pre-
     
25 
I. Overview of the Bankruptcy Process in Mass Tort Liabilities 
 Section 524(g) of the Code allows for a reorganization plan to con-
tain a trust and channeling injunction specifically in cases of asbestos-
related tort claims (a “section 524(g) plan”).26 Section 105(a) of the 
Code allows such a system to be set up for other types of mass-liability 
torts (a “section 105(a) plan”).27 Although the two systems are similar, 
they have slightly different requirements that must be met before the 
reorganization plan can be confirmed by the bankruptcy court.28 Under 
both systems, the debtor must obtain votes in favor of the plan from all 
classes of creditors.29 Yet, when seeking confirmation of a section 524(g) 
plan, a debtor must also obtain approval from seventy-five
cu ent asbestos claimants.30 In contrast, a section 105(a) plan has no 
such requirement; instead, the debtor must demonstrate that the in-
junction and trust are both necessary and appropriate.31 
 To obtain the requisite votes, the debtor must negotiate with the 
claimants’ counsel.32 The nature of the mass tort liability industry is 
that typically a very small number of firms represent a large number of 
claimants.33 Thus, a
vent a plan from being approved by the bankruptcy court because they 
likely represent a large number of the creditor votes that are required 
for confirmation.34 
                                                                                                                 
25 See infra notes 78–118 and accompanying text. 
26 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) (2006). 
27 See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a); Global Indus. Techs., 645 F.3d at 205 n.10 (explaining that the 
Ban
c.), 634 F.3d 79, 106 (2d Cir. 2011) (explaining that for each class of creditors, both 
a m nting at 
leas
t 201 n.4. 
 To satisfy this require-
men oth neces-
sary ndus. Techs., 645 F.3d at 206. 
680 (3d Cir. 2005). 
t 285. 
kruptcy Code has been interpreted to allow trusts and channeling injunctions for mass 
tort liabilities in non-asbestos claims). 
28 See Global Indus. Techs., 645 F.3d at 205–06; Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d at 201 n.4. 
29 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c). See Dish Network Corp. v. DBSD N. Am. Inc. (In re DBSD N. 
Am., In
ajority of the total number of creditors as well as a number of creditors represe
t two-thirds of the total value of the claims must vote in favor of the reorganization 
plan). 
30 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb); Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d a
31 See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a); Global Indus. Techs., 645 F.3d at 206.
t, a party must demonstrate “with specificity that the. . . . [i]njunction is b
 to the reorganization and fair.” Global I
32 See In re Congoleum Corp., 426 F.3d 675, 
33 Global Indus. Techs., 645 F.3d at 205 n.8; Plevin et al., supra note 4, at 284. 
34 See Plevin et al., supra note 4, a
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 When the debtor files for relief, it submits the proposed plan as 
well as a tally of the creditors’ votes.35 The bankruptcy court then holds 
a plan confirmation hearing.36 At the hearing, parties who have stand-
ing are able to offer support or objections for consideration.37 Finally, 
the bankruptc reorganization 
lan
y and, consequently, will have 
                                                                                                                     
y court either confirms or denies the 
p .38 
II. Redefining Insurance Neutrality 
 Insurance neutrality refers to the impact that a proposed reorgani-
zation plan has on the insurance company.39 Specifically, a plan is in-
surance neutral if it does not put the insurance company in a less-
favorable position than it was pre-petition.40 If a plan is not insurance 
neutral, an insurer has suffered an injur
standing in the confirmation hearing.41 Thus, what a court considers to 
be insurance neutral will determine whether an insurer is able to par-
ticipate in the bankruptcy proceeding.42 
 The assignment of an insurance policy to a trust does not, by itself, 
require the insurers to contribute indemnity funds to the trust.43 In-
stead, a claim must be successfully asserted against the trust before an 
insurer becomes liable for indemnity under the policy.44 Because insur-
ers do not contribute any money at the time the trust is established, 
injury does not arise from a present financial loss.45 Instead, the courts 
must look deeper into the reorganization plan to determine whether it 
is insurance neutral.46 In May 2011, in Global Industries, the Third Cir-
 
 Asbestos Bankruptcies: Down but Not Out, 63 N.Y.U. 
Ann
064. 
t the reorganization plan 
was rs did have standing), with In re Combustion 
Eng 91 F.3d 190, 218 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding that the reorganization plan was 
insurance neutral such that the insurers did not have standing). 
 See Harbour & Elgie, supra note 41, at 48–49. 
35 Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d at 201 n.4. 
36 See Eric D. Green et al., Prepackaged
. Surv. Am. L. 727, 731 (2008). 
37 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (2006); see Global Indus. Techs., 645 F.3d at 210. 
38 See Resnick, supra note 6, at 2
39 See In re Global Indus. Techs., Inc., 645 F.3d 201, 212 (3d Cir. 2004). 
40 See id. “Pre-petition” refers to the period before the bankruptcy petition is filed. See 
Green et al., supra note 36, at 744. 
41 See Jason W. Harbour & Tara L. Elgie, Insurance Neutrality: Will Global Industrial Tech-
nologies Have a Major Impact?, Am. Bankr. Inst. J., July/Aug. 2011, at 48, 49 (noting that the 
existence of an insurance neutral reorganization plan results in a denial of standing). 
42 Compare Global Indus. Techs., 645 F.3d at 212–14 (finding tha
not insurance neutral and thus the insure
’g, Inc., 3
43 See Global Indus. Techs., 645 F.3d at 214. 
44 See id. 
45 See id. 
46
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c
r burdens.54 
Accordingly, the court held the plan was insurance neutral and there-
fore did ng to 
al
uit altered its approach for determining insurance neutrality.47 Sec-
tion A of this Part explains the textual approach that the court has his-
torically used; Section B describes the new, quantitative method re-
cently implemented.48 
A. Combustion Engineering: A Textual Approach to Insurance Neutrality 
 In Combustion Engineering, the Third Circuit considered whether a 
group of insurers had standing, on appeal, to challenge the bankruptcy 
court’s confirmation of a reorganization plan.49 Although this case dis-
cussed appellate standing and not bankruptcy standing, the discussion 
of insurance neutrality is applicable to both types of standing.50 
 The reorganization plan in Combustion Engineering included an as-
signment of the debtor’s insurance policies to a trust established under 
section 524(g) of the Code.51 In relation to the assignment, the plan 
provided that all parties would retain the rights given to them under 
the insurance policies.52 The court found that the insurers did not have 
standing, based on the language of the reorganization plan.53 Because 
the plan affirmed the pre-petition contractual provisions of the policy, 
it neither impaired the insurers’ rights nor increased thei
 not constitute an injury giving rise to appellate standi
ch lenge the addition of the provision.55 Essentially, the court based 
their determination of insurance neutrality on whether the text of the 
plan itself affected the insurance company and its rights.56 
                                                                                                                      
47 See Global Indus. Techs., 645 F.3d at 212. 
–56 and accompanying text; infra notes 57–77 and accompanying 
text
l Indus. Techs., 645 F.3d at 209–10 & n.23 (explaining that the test for appel-
late nding in the underlying bankruptcy 
pro
s, rights or causes of action that 
any he provisions, terms, conditions, defenses and/or exclu-
sion ined in the Subject Insurance Policies . . . .”). 
 does not impair their rights or increase 
thei s under the subject insurance policies. We conclude, therefore, the . . . . 
[i]n ). 
48 See infra notes 49
. 
49 391 F.3d at 218. 
50 See Globa
 standing is more stringent than the test for sta
ceeding). 
51 391 F.3d at 201; see 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) (2006). 
52 Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d at 216–17 & n.26 (“Nothing in the Plan or the Confirma-
tion Order shall be deemed to waive any claims, defense
 Entity has or may have under t
s conta
53 Id. at 218. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. (“[T]he neutrality provision. . . . protects the pre-petition rights and obligations 
of both the debtor and the insurers. . . . [Thus it]
r burden
surers . . . have no appellate standing . . . .”
56 See id. 
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B. Global Industrial Technologies: Going Beyond the Text 
 In 2002, Global Industrial Technologies, Inc. and related entities 
(collectively, the “Debtors”) were forced into bankruptcy.57 Before filing, 
the Debtors had resolved over 200,000 asbestos claims and had about 
235,000 additional asbestos claims pending.58 The Debtors also had one 
silica-related class action suit pending, consisting of 169 claims.59 The 
Debtors only acknowledged the asbestos claims, not the silica claims, as 
a reason for seeking relief.60 The proposed plan of reorganization in-
cluded an asbestos claims trust and channeling injunction under sec-
ion t 524(g) of the Code, as well as a trust and channeling injunction for 
the silica-related claims under section 105(a) of the Code.61 The Debt-
ors intended to fund the silica trust by assigning certain insurance poli-
cies to it.62 The plan contained a provision just like that in Combustion 
Engineering, keeping the insurers’ contractual rights and obligations un-
der the policies intact.63 
 The Debtors solicited confirmation votes from law firms who rep-
resented both current asbestos claimants and individuals with silica-
related tort claims against other companies.64 This solicitation resulted 
in a significant increase in the number of silica-related tort claims as-
serted against the Debtors.65 In fact, 5125 votes for the plan were sub-
mitted on behalf of individuals claiming that the Debtors were respon-
sible for their silica-related injuries.66 Each of the 5125 claimants were 
represented by a firm that also represented asbestos claimants, and 
4039 of the claimants were represented by one of five law firms.67 
 At the confirmation hearing, the insurers objected to the pro-
posed plan, arguing that the silica trust was neither necessary nor ap-
propriate for the Debtors’ reorganization under the meaning of section 
105(a) of the code.68 Additionally, the insurers questioned the integrity 
                                                                                                                      
57 Global Indus. Techs., 645 F.3d at 204–05. 
t 204. 
006). 
es of action” avail-
able in available to the insurer). 
s. Techs., 645 F.3d at 205. 
ls asserting silica-related 
claim plan of reorganization was proposed. Id. at 204. 
t 206. 
58 Id. a
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 205. 
61 Id.; see 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 524(g) (2
62 Global Indus. Techs., 645 F.3d at 205. 
63 See id. at 206; Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d at 216 n.26 (explaining that the neutrality 
provision in the plan provides that the “claims, defenses, rights or caus
 under the insurance policy are to rema
64 Global Indu
65 Id. at 206. 
66 Id. This number is to be compared with the 169 individua
s before the 
67 Id. a
68 Id. 
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of the bankruptcy proceeding, specifically asserting that the Debtor 
had bargained with the claimants’ counsel to pay for counterfeit silica 
claims in exchange for asbestos claimants’ confirmation votes.69 
 The Third Circuit found that the insurance companies did have 
standing to object to the reorganization plan.70 Although the court did 
not overturn its previous decision in Combustion Engineering, it expanded 
the idea of insurance neutrality.71 Instead of looking at the text of the 
plan, the court relied on the increase in silica claims to justify a finding 
that the plan was not insurance neutral.72 The court reasoned that the 
administrative costs resulting from increased potential liability consti-
tuted an injury, even if the insurer was never indemnified for a single 
claim.73 Although previously the court had defined insurance neutral as 
not affecting an insurer’s rights, it now defined the term as not materi-
ally altering the “quantum of liability” to which an insurer was ex-
ose
llusion.76 Because both the claimants and Debtors had 
an interest in increasing the size of the trust, the court reasoned that 
the insurers were the only party with an incentive to pursue the charge 
of collusion.77 
                                                                                                                     
p d.74 In effect, the court changed the focus of the insurance neutral-
ity inquiry from the substance of the proposed plan to the number of 
claims asserted.75 
 Although the court engaged in a discussion of insurance neutral-
ity, a large motivating factor behind its decision was the non-frivolous 
allegation of co
 
69 Id. 
70 Global Indus. Techs., 645 F.3d at 216 (holding that the insurers met the requirements 
for both Constitutional standing and Code standing). 
71 Compare Global Indus. Techs., 645 F.3d at 212 (finding that a plan is insurance neutral 
when it “does not materially alter the quantum of liability that the insurers would be called 
to absorb”), with Combustion Eng’g., 391 F.3d at 218 (finding that the plan was insurance 
neutral because it did not “impair [the insurers’] rights or increase their burdens under 
the subject insurance policies”). 
72 See Global Indus. Techs., 645 F.3d at 212. 
73 Id. at 214. 
74 See id. at 212; Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d at 218. 
75 Compare Global Indus. Techs., 645 F.3d at 212 (concluding that insurance neutrality 
depends on whether the number of claims asserted increased post-petition), with Combus-
tion Eng’g., 391 F.3d at 218 (concluding that insurance neutrality depends on whether the 
insurer’s rights and responsibilities under the original insurance policy are affected). 
76 See Global Indus. Techs., 645 F.3d at 214. 
77 See id. (noting that the insurers were the only party with an incentive to assert a 
charge of collusion); see also In re Congoleum Corp., 426 F.3d 675, 687 (3d Cir. 2005) (find-
ing that the insurers had standing, in part, because the insurers were the only parties with 
incentives to raise the issue of an ethical violation). 
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III. Examining the Rationale for Redefining Insurance 
Neutrality to Find Standing 
 The Third Circuit relied on both definitional and policy rationales 
to support insurer standing in Global Industrial Technologies.78 First, it 
asserted a definitional rationale by concluding that a sudden increase 
in the number of claims asserted against an insurer means that the in-
surer is suffering an injury.79 This Comment argues, however, that the 
difference in the number of pre-petition and post-petition claims is not 
an accurate measure of whether an insurer has been harmed, particu-
larly when there is no threat of collusion.80 
 Second, the court used a policy rationale by stating that granting 
standing to the only party with an incentive to assert issues of abuse 
protects the integrity of the bankruptcy proceeding.81 This Comment 
argues, however, that it would be more effective and appropriate for 
the court to combat collusion and other threats to the integrity of the 
bankruptcy process through its own motions, rather than to grant 
standing to third parties to do so.82 
A. The Quantum of Liability Is an Ineffective Measure of Insurance Neutrality 
 The Third Circuit’s quantum of liability standard is an ineffective 
benchmark for determining whether an insurer has suffered injury.83 
Insurance companies are unique in that their business is based entirely 
on risk-assessment.84 Insurers do not have perfect information about 
the clients they choose to insure; accordingly, each insurance policy 
necessarily involves a risk that the client may incur a loss which the in-
surance company will have to cover.85 Insurers are cognizant of this risk 
and expect to incur losses on some policies.86 This lack of perfect in-
formation prevents insurers from knowing exactly which policies will 
incur losses.87 As a result, insurance companies distribute the risk by 
                                                                                                                      
78 See 645 F.3d 201, 215 (3d Cir. 2011). 
79 Id. at 214. 
80 See infra notes 83–97 and accompanying text. 
81 See Global Indus. Techs., 645 F.3d at 215. 
82 See infra notes 103–118 and accompanying text. 
83 See infra notes 83–97 and accompanying text. 
84 See Robert E. Keeton & Alan I. Widiss, Insurance Law: A Guide to Fundamen-
tal Principles, Legal Doctrines, and Commercial Practices 8 (1988); Thomas R. 
Foley, Insurers’ Misrepresentation Defense: The Need for a Knowledge Element, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
659, 673 (1994). 
85 See Keeton & Widiss, supra note 84, at 12. 
86 See Foley, supra note 84, at 673. 
87 See Keeton & Widiss, supra note 84, at 12. 
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grouping clients into pools based on common characteristics, and pric-
ing each pool with the knowledge that some clients within the pool will 
incur losses.88 
 The quantum of liability standard imposed by the Third Circuit 
implies that an increase in exposure to liability injures the insurer.89 
Even if the claims were to be realized, a loss on a particular policy, no 
matter how large, is not necessarily an “injury” to an insurance com-
pany.90 An insurer’s ability to spread losses over all members of a par-
ticular group means that suffering a loss on one particular policy does 
not necessarily harm that insurer, if the premiums charged to others 
compensate the insurer for that loss.91 
 Even assuming that an increase in claims does constitute an injury, 
the quantum of liability test remains ineffective.92 Future claimants are 
able to assert claims against the trust; the Third Circuit’s test for injury, 
however, does not take that type of liability into account.93 Both asbes-
tos and silica claims can lie dormant for long periods of time; thus, it is 
not uncommon for illnesses—-and subsequently claims—-to arise long 
after the bankruptcy has terminated.94 
 In fact, using the quantum of liability as a measure of injury would 
actually be detrimental to an insurer when the number of future claim-
                                                                                                                      
88 See id. at 12–13. 
89 See Global Indus. Techs., 645 F.3d at 213–14. 
90 See Foley, supra note 84, at 673 (noting that “[i]nsurers are able to spread the rela-
tively few large losses over a large number of premium-paying individuals or entities”). An 
increase in exposure to liability means that there are more claims being asserted against 
the trust. See Global Indus. Techs., 645 F.3d at 213–14. Even though some administrative 
costs arise from the increase in exposure, losses from the claims are not realized until 
those claims are successfully asserted against the trust and survive coverage defenses. See id. 
91 See Foley, supra note 84, at 673. For instance, assume that an insurer has issued ten 
policies and has set the premiums based on the expectation that it will suffer $1000 in 
losses. See id. If one policyholder incurs liability valued at $750, the insurance company is 
not harmed, even though it is paying for that particular loss, because it priced the group of 
policies with the expectation of covering a greater loss than was actually incurred. See id. 
92 See infra notes 93–97 and accompanying text. 
93 See Global Indus. Techs., 645 F.3d at 212; Plevin et al., supra note 4, at 271 (defining 
future claimants as “persons who were exposed to asbestos pre-petition but who have not 
yet developed any asbestos-related condition”). 
94 See Plevin et al., supra note 4, at 276; Peter Tipps, The Lead Paint Debate: Why Control Is 
Not an Element of Public Nuisance, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 605, 635 (2009). The bankruptcy court 
appoints a representative for the future claimants to ensure that their interests are pro-
tected throughout the petition process. See Plevin et al., supra note 4, at 280. Although the 
process is imperfect, it does provide trust access to claimants whose illnesses will not ma-
ture until after the bankruptcy has ended. See generally id. (explaining the role of a future 
claims representative and problems within the current system). 
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ants far outweighs the number of current claimants.95 Relying on the 
number of claims at the time the petition is filed would not accurately 
reflect the insurer’s potential liability.96 As a result, the insurer would 
not be able to participate in the bankruptcy proceeding, even though 
the plan may actually harm the insurer once the future claimants 
he rights that 
the insurer will have when those claims are asserted.102 
B. The Court, Not ect the Integrity of  
ruptcy court the power to exercise such authority.105 Under this statute, 
                                                                                                                     
emerge.97 
 The approach to defining insurance neutrality laid out in Combus-
tion Engineering more accurately assesses whether an insurer has been 
injured.98 Focusing on the relationship between the insurer’s pre-
petition and post-petition rights ensures that the original bargain made 
by the debtor and insurer is upheld.99 Furthermore, this approach is 
more consistent with insurance industry practice, because it allows the 
insurer to accurately absorb the costs of using risk valuation as a money-
making tool.100 Additionally, an inquiry into the contractual rights of 
the insurer better captures the injury that would occur from current 
and future claims.101 Although it is impossible to determine how many 
claims will be asserted in the future, the Combustion Engineering defini-
tion of insurance neutrality allows the court to analyze t
 the Insurers, Should Prot
Bankruptcy Proceedings 
 The court should protect the integrity of bankruptcy proceedings, 
and not rely on third parties to do so.103 Not only is the existence of a 
third party with standing uncertain, particularly in mass tort liability 
cases, but also it is the court’s responsibility to prevent abuses of proc-
ess.104 Accordingly, section 105(a) of the Code expressly gives the bank-
 
95 See infra notes 96–97 and accompanying text. 
96 See Plevin et al., supra note 4, at 271. 
97 See Global Indus. Techs., 645 F.3d at 212; Plevin et al., supra note 4, at 271. 
98 See 391 F.3d 190, 218 (3d Cir. 2004); infra notes 99–102 and accompanying text. 
99 See Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d at 218. 
100 See Foley, supra note 84, at 673. 
101 See Plevin et al., supra note 4, at 276. 
102 See Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d at 218; Plevin et al., supra note 4, at 271–72. 
103 See infra notes 104–118 and accompanying text. 
104 See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991). 
105 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006) (“No provision of this title providing for the raising of an is-
sue by a party in interest shall be construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking 
any action or making any determination necessary. . . . to prevent an abuse of process.”). 
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the court is able to take a range of actions on its own, from issuing civil 
sanctions to dismissing the case entirely.106 
 From a practical perspective, relying on third parties to assert con-
cerns of procedural integrity is problematic.107 To object to any wrong-
doing, an insurer whose policy is being used to fund a trust needs to sat-
isfy the quantum of liability test to establish standing.108 It is possible, 
however, that the integrity of the bankruptcy proceeding could be com-
promised, without a subsequent increase in the number of claims.109 For 
instance, if an agreement were made in favor of future claimants, either 
by the current claimants’ counsel expecting future business, or by the 
future claimants’ representative, there would be no immediate increase 
in claims.110 In such a situation the insurer may still have an incentive to 
assert integrity concerns because of the potential for heightened expo-
sure to liability, just as in Global Industrial Technologies.111 Yet, because 
there would be no difference in the number of pre- and post-petition 
claims, the quantum of liability test would not be satisfied and thus the 
insurer would not have standing to assert any objections.112 
 From a policy perspective, the bankruptcy court should be respon-
sible for taking appropriate measures to ensure that the process is not 
being abused.113 Exploitation of the judicial process harms not only the 
individual parties to the case, but the legal institution as a whole.114 
Thus, the court has a duty to ensure that the integrity of the court sys-
tem is not compromised.115 From an efficiency standpoint, the court is 
in the best position to prevent such abuses.116 The court is the only en-
tity that is present in every case, and can serve as a consistent, diligent 
                                                                                                                      
106 See Michael L. Cook & Robert L. Ordin, Bankruptcy Litigation Manual § 2.03 (2011) 
(“Several courts have . . . interpreted the . . . language to allow such dismissals on the 
court’s own motion.”). See generally Catherine E. Vance, Attorney Liability: Sources of Bank-
ruptcy Court Sanctioning Authority, SM048 ALI-ABA 165 (2006) (explaining the nature and 
source of the bankruptcy court’s sanctioning authority). 
107 See infra notes 108–112 and accompanying text. 
108 See Global Indus. Techs., 645 F.3d at 212. 
109 See id. 
110 See Plevin et al., supra note 4, at 276. 
111 See 645 F.3d at 214. 
112 See id. at 212. 
113 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006); Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44 (“This ‘historic power of eq-
uity. . . .’ is necessary to the integrity of the courts[;] for ‘tampering with the administra-
tion of justice. . . . is a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the 
public.’” (quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 245–46 
(1944))). 
114 Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44. 
115 See id. 
116 See id. at 43. 
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eye over all proceedings.117 Similarly, the court’s expertise and familiar-
ity with the bankruptcy process makes it best suited to notice any im-
propriety which may be occurring.118 
Conclusion 
 The Third Circuit in Global Industrial Technologies struggled to de-
termine whether an insurer whose policies had been assigned to a trust 
to fund mass tort claims should have standing in the underlying bank-
ruptcy proceeding. Although the court’s revision of the previous test 
for insurance neutrality and subsequent finding of standing may have 
made sense in this specific case, the new standard may be problematic 
in future cases. Instead, the court should return to the more balanced 
Combustion Engineering definition of insurance neutrality to better de-
termine when an insurance company is actually injured under the 
meaning of the Constitution and the Code. Similarly, the Third Circuit 
should encourage the bankruptcy court to use their sua sponte power 
under the Code as a means of ensuring that the bankruptcy process is 
free of abuse instead of allowing reliance on other parties to assert such 
concerns. 
Jennifer Kent 
 
117 See id. 
118 See id. at 43–44. 
 INSERTED BLANK PAGE 
 
